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1. DESCRIPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. In June 1985 the European Council decided to grant 
special relief to the countries of Africa which had suffered 
worst from drought in 1984 and 1985. Consequently, on 4 
November 1985, the Council of Ministers approved a 
100 Mio ECU rehabilitation and revival plan (RRP) for six 
countries (Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sudan and 
Chad). This was known as the Natali Plan. The plan was to 
be funded to the extent of 75 Mio ECU from the fourth 
EDF and, to the extent of 25 Mio ECU, from the fifth EDF. 
Subsequently, four other countries (Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde and Somalia) were added to the list of 
recipients without any other amendment to the overall 
package (see table 1). The Rehabilitation and Revival Plan 
(RRP) took effect from the signature of the financing 
agreement on 26 January 1986. 
1.2. The RRP was assigned a double objective: 
(a) to reinforce the existing structures in the recipient 
countries intended to deal with drought situations; 
(b) to support the rural areas which have suffered from the 
drought by reviving agriculture there. 
The RRP was thus not intended to concern itself with the 
setting-up of new structures but, rather, to support 
measures which would allow economic activity to recover 
or to improve the countries' abilities to overcome further 
catastrophes. It was therefore to establish an intermediary 
link between emergency aid and the long-term develop-
ment plans of the third Lome Convention (sixth EDF). 
1.3. As the Plan was to be jointly financed and executed 
by the Community and the Member States (initially 
100 Mio ECU to be financed by the EDF and at least 
100 Mio ECU by the Member States) the Council stressed 
that the Commission should coordinate its actions with 
those financed under bilateral aid programmes. 
Between December 1985 and July 1986, the Commission 
organized four coordination meetings between the Com-
mission and donors of bilateral aid, during which 
information was exchanged, and, at local level, a number 
of attempts were made to organize joint EDF/Member 
State actions. However, mainly because of a lack of 
effective response by the Member States, it was only rarely 
possible to integrate EDF measures with bilateral aid. The 
cooperation hardly went beyond the level of an exchange of 
information and more comprehensive coordination 
occured in only three cases : 
(a) a fleet of vehicles in Ethiopia (4,7 Mio ECU) (FRG); 
(b) road and rail in Sudan (4,5 Mio ECU) (NL and UK); 
(c) rice marketing in Niger (2,0 Mio ECU) (F). 
CONSISTENCY OF MEASURES WITH OBJECTIVES 
1.4. The Court's examination covered the operations in 
favour of the six countries originally designated for relief, 
involving a total of 96,4 Mio ECU. Visits were made to four 
of these countries (Ethiopia, Mauritania, Sudan and Chad). 
The great majority of the measures chosen corresponded to 
the objectives of the RRP, among which one of the most 
important was that the actions should be executed urgently 
and have immediate effects. Only in four cases were the 
measures financed concerned with longer-term develop-
ment operations rather than immediate revival: 
(a) in Ethiopia: 
(i) irrigation projects (2,9 Mio ECU); 
(ii) soil erosion control (2,1 Mio ECU); 
(b) in Mauritania: 
(i) road infrastructure (2,0 Mio ECU); 
(ii) irrigation (2,0 Mio ECU). 
1.5. In most of the countries, the appropriations available 
were distributed among the largest possible number of 
beneficiaries in order to augment the psychological impact 
of the aid. The consequent dispersal of effort was a 
considerable burden on the logistical and administrative 
organization of the Plan and diluted the intended impact. 
This was particularly so in Ethiopia. Those problems could 
have been avoided if the aid had been concentrated on a 
smaller number of actions as in Mali (see paragraph 1.9 and 
table 2). 
1.6. In accordance with the financing agreements, the 
measures which were financed under the RRP had to be 
carried out quickly, and it was therefore essential to 
approach bodies or institutions which were carefully 27. 3. 91  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 83/3 
chosen because of their experience and their organizational 
abilities. In practice, however, in most cases, aid was 
automatically directed to the national departments with 
administrative responsibility for the areas of activity 
concerned. In several cases, those departments had great 
difficulty in implementing the aid. This was particularly the 
case: 
(a) in Ethiopia: Mio ECU 
(i) the irrigation projects 2,9 
(ii) the distribution of inputs 3,0 
(iii) the construction of small stores 0,7 
(b) in Mauritania: 
(i) the propagation of seeds 0,4 
(ii) the irrigation projects 2,0 
(c) in Niger: 
(i) the market-garden crops 0,3 
(d) in Sudan: 
(i) the supply of agricultural inputs 3,6 
12,9 
In Ethiopia and Sudan, the execution of RRP programmes 
was long delayed by the national authorities, who were 
preoccupied with forwarding and coordinating emergency 
aid. In Mauritania, administrative sluggishness caused 
delays and led to funds from the RRP being directly 
channelled into long-term development projects already 
under way. 
1.7. When choosing intermediaries, better account ought 
to have been taken of the real organizational abilities of the 
national departments. Drawing more on the experience of 
the Commission delegations, commitments should only 
have been entered into with bodies with proven track 
records. However, in several cases, calling on competent 
technical assistance allowed at least partial compensation 
for the shortcomings of some of the public or semi-public 
bodies. 
560 000 ECU was drawn up, over and above the 100 Mio 
ECU programme ceiling. 
1.9. The plan of action laid down by the Commission in 
October 1985 basically provided for measures which could 
be urgently implemented in order to produce immediate 
results in the framework of 1986-1987 agricultural 
campaign. To this end the Commission intended that each 
country would concentrate on one or two types of action so 
as to avoid dispersal of effort. In view of the urgent nature 
of the measures to be undertaken, certain EDF procedures 
were amended. There were three significant amendments: 
the Chief Authorizing Officer of the EDF (the Director 
General for Development) had himself to take the 
financing decisions, by virtue of a delegation of powers 
from the governments of the recipient States; 
(b) the procedures for choosing the successful tenderers to 
whom contracts would be awarded had to be made 
more flexible in the interests of expediting the 
rehabilitation and revival plan; 
wherever possible, the National Authorizing Officer 
was required to delegate powers, so that the decisions 
could be taken at a level closer to that of the measure 
itself. 
1.10. From the outset, it was clear that accelerated 
implementation would call for devolution of decisions in 
favour of the Commission delegations. However, instruc-
tions they received to this effect, were not precise enough, 
so that delegations often had to improvise and gradually 
persuade the Commission's central departments to allow 
more flexibility in the decision-making system. Whereas 
the consistency of such a system can only be maintained if a 
rigorous reporting procedure is set up to allow overall 
guidance of the measures, in practice, no real reporting 
system was instituted and the degree of information going 
to the central departments remained insufficient throug-
hout the operation. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES 
1.8. Within the Commission, responsibility for the 
implementation of the RRP was assigned, from November 
1985 to December 1987, to a task force which was 
responsible, on the one hand, for drawing up guidelines and 
instructions for the preparation and execution of the Plan, 
and, on the other hand, for the coordination and follow-up 
of the measures. It was to set up a reporting system which 
would regularly produce an overall analysis and an 
assessment of the state of progress of the Plan. The task 
force was also to have responsibility for providing a 
permanent link with the delegations, the Member States, 
the other donors and the embassies of the recipient ACP 
States. In order to help the Commission departments in 
these tasks, a technical assistance contract for a sum of 
1.11. In view of the multiplicity of parties involved 
(beneficiary administrations, Member States, other donors, 
contractors, technical assistance staff etc.), a coordination 
structure was also called for in the beneficiary country. But 
even in cases where a coordinator had been appointed, he 
was not given sufficient authority to be able to exercise any 
real influence over the course of events. Finally, with the 
exception of Mali, the RRP operations, due to overall 
organizational weaknesses, experienced delays which were 
significant in the case of an operation where urgency was to 
be of the essence (agricultural campaign 1986/87). This 
was one of the reasons why the deadline for approval of the 
secondary commitments was initially set at 1 July 1986. 
Less than half of the amount had been committed in that 
sense by that date as a consequence of which the deadline 
was put back to 30 June 1987. Even on this date, the No C 83/4  Official Journal of the European Communities  27. 3. 91 
Commission's accounts showed only 85 Mio ECU of 
commitments, with 15 Mio ECU still pending. 
1.12. At end 1989, the financial situation of the RRP was 
as shown in Table 1. Four years after the launch of the Plan, 
intended to be executed in two years, five measures had still 
not been completed: 
However, in spite of the initial delays, most of the measures 
were carried out in three years, i.e. before the end of the 
financial year 1988. In Mauritania, this was possible only 
because the bulk of the operations which were being 
financed were part of EDF projects already under way, and 
the RRP funds thus came as a kind of top-up to the 
financing provided under the sixth EDF. 
(a) irrigation (2,9 Mio ECU) and rural technology 
(3,5 Mio ECU) in Ethiopia: 6,4Mio ECU;  2. COUNTERPART FUNDS 
(b) Mali/Senegal railway (regional programme): 1,7 Mio 
ECU; 
(c) the hydraulic project in the East of Niger: 1,1 Mio 
ECU; 
(d) agricultural inputs in Sudan: 3,6 Mio ECU. 
2.1. Although the Court has referred to counterpart 
funds in relation to the Rehabilitation and Revival Plan in 
its 1989 Annual Report, its observations are repeated here 
so as to present in one document a complete picture of the 
Plan. 
2.2. For several operations, amounting to 7 Mio ECU, 
the measures launched were to be prolonged by the 
establishment and use in the recipient country of counter-
Table 1 — Financial situation of Rehabilitation and Revival Plan at 31 December 1989 
Country 
INITIAL BENEFICIARIES 
Ethiopia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Sudan 
Chad 
ADDITIONAL BENEFICIARIES 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde 
Somalia 
All ACP (!) 
4th EDF 
5th EDF 
Financing 
Decisions 
Mio ECU 
(a) 
37,1 
12,5 
7,9 
10,6 
14,8 
11,0 
93,3 
2,9 
0,1 
1,0 
1,3 
99,2 
0,5 
99,7 
74,9 
24,8 
99,7 
Commitments 
Mio ECU 
(b) 
36,8 
12,4 
7,6 
10,4 
14,7 
10,9 
92,8 
2,9 
0,1 
0,9 
1,3 
98,0 
0,4 
98,4 
74,3 
24,1 
98,4 
% (b) 
of (a) 
99 
99 
96 
98 
99 
99 
99 
100 
100 
90 
100 
99 
80 
99 
99 
97 
99 
Payments 
Mio ECU 
(c) 
36,2 
12,1 
7,6 
10,0 
13,5 
9,5 
88,9 
2,8 
0,1 
0,9 
1,3 
94,0 
0,4 
94,4 
72,1 
22,3 
94,4 
% (c) 
of (a) 
98 
97 
96 
94 
91 
86 
95 
97 
100 
90 
100 
95 
80 
95 
96 
90 
95 
(') Miscellaneous expenditure 27. 3. 91  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 83/5 
Table 2 — Revival and Rehabilitation Plan (Analysis by sector of activity: ceiling amounts) 
(Mio ECU) 
Support measures Logistics 
Railways 
Roads and bridges 
Air transport 
Fleets of heavy vehicles 
Ports 
Early warning systems 
Medical projects 
Resettlement of displaced persons 
Storage facilities 
Agricultural revival projects 
Hydraulics 
Irrigation 
Crop protection 
Rural technology 
Reafforestation 
Farm inputs 
Agricultural techniques and production 
Marketing of agricultural products 
Loan facilities for farmers 
Non-governmental facilities 
Other projects 
Technical assistance 
Total 
Ethiopia 
2,7 
— 
— 
4,7 
— 
— 
— 
— 
1,8 
4,7 
2,9 
4,3 
3,4 
2,1 
4,2 
1,0 
— 
— 
4,3 
0,3 
0,7 
37,1 
Mali 
4,2 
3,4 
— 
— 
— 
1,6 
2,3 
— 
— 
— 
0,4 
0,5 
— 
0,1 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
12,5 
Mauri-
tania 
— 
2,0 
— 
— 
0,1 
— 
0,6 
— 
— 
— 
1,9 
0,2 
1,5 
1,3 
— 
— 
— 
— 
0,3 
7,9 
•** 
— 
2,5 
— 
— 
— • 
— 
— 
— 
2,5 
1,1 
— 
— 
— 
2,3 
2,0 
— 
— 
0,1 
0,1 
10,6 
Sudan 
2,1 
2,4 
0,8 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
0,8 
0,3 
— 
— 
3,6 
3,9 
— 
0,9 
14,8 
Chad 
— 
4,8 
— 
— 
— 
1,0 
0,1 
2,4 
— 
2,0 
— 
0,5 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
0,2 
11,0 
Additional 
countries 
1,0 
4,2 
0,1 
5,3 
Reserve 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
0,5 
— 
0,5 
Total 
9,0 
15,1 
0,8 
4,7 
1,1 
2,6 
3,0 
2,4 
4,3 
12,0 
5,2 
6,3 
3,4 
2,1 
6,0 
4,7 
2,0 
3,6 
8,2 
1,0 
2,2 
99,7 
part funds. The special conditions governing the granting 
of aid specified that the counterpart funds were to be 
deposited in separate bank accounts, that the funds could 
be used for specific operations only and that the 
Community had to be kept regularly informed of the 
accounting situation. 
2.3. The counterpart funds were specifically to come 
from: 
(a) in Ethiopia: 
(i) a programme for the transport and 
distribution of fertilizers 
(b) in Mauritania: 
(i) the sale of agricultural inputs 
(c) in Niger: 
(i) rice marketing 
(ii) the sale on credit of cattle 
(d) in Sudan: 
(i) the institution of a system of 
agricultural credit 
Mio ECU 
2,5 
0,5 
2,0 
0,4 
1,6 
7,0 
2.4. In Ethiopia (2,5 Mio ECU), no checks on the 
establishment of the counterpart funds were organized. 
The Ethiopian authorities considered that the funds 
initially paid over were meant simply to cover the cost of 
the transport of the fertilizers. No moves to account for the 
counterpart funds were made subsequently. Closer follow-
up by the delegation would have allowed the situation to be 
rectified in time. In Mauritania, there are no indications 
that specific accounts were kept for the counterpart funds, 
and the delegation was not given any information in this 
respect. Moreover, it appears doubtful whether there were 
any real possibilities of creating counterpart funds there. 
The Court found that: 
the management of the agricultural input stocks left 
much to be desired, due to precarious storage 
conditions which exposed the fertilizers to hardening, 
and because the quantities being held in stock 
represented around five years' use; 
(b) the prices at which seeds were sold were between 10 % 
and 35 % below cost price because of the system of 
subsidies to farmers in force in the country. No C 83/6  Official Journal of the European Communities  27. 3. 91 
2.5. In both cases, it was clear that the expected value of 
counterpart funds would diminish rapidly. In Niger, in the 
case of rice marketing support (2 Mio ECU), the system 
was that RRP funds financed the purchase of rice by the 
local marketing body in the first instance. This was then 
delivered into storage alongside similar rice financed from 
other sources. Thus when subsequent sales took place it 
was not possible to identify the RRP financed rice as such. 
Even though it had been agreed that the proceeds of sales 
would be put into a revolving counterpart fund as they took 
place it was not practicable to do so. In these circumstances 
it would have been preferable to ask for funds to be 
deposited according to a pre-established timetable and to 
require certified accounts to be forwarded from the 
marketing office. No information has been provided on 
sales of cattle in Niger since the technical assistance left in 
November 1987. Only in Sudan (1,6 Mio ECU) was it 
possible to establish the precise situation of the counterpart 
funds. 
2.6. The difficulties in following up the counterpart funds 
under the RRP are due to the ambiguous attitude adopted 
by the Commission and the lack of instructions to the 
delegations in this respect. The funds were granted subject 
to acceptance by the recipients of strict conditions of 
supervision, but in practice, both the central departments 
and the Commission delegations were reluctant to carry 
out rigorous follow-up of the establishment and use of 
counterpart funds. With the multiplication of these funds 
generated by Community aid (food aid, sectoral import 
programmes, special debt programme, supplies and 
procurement in the context of traditional projects), it is 
time that a clear and realistic policy on counterpart funds 
was drawn up by the Community and strictly implemented 
by the Commission. 
3. FOLLOW-UP OF RESULTS 
ON-THE-SPOT MONITORING OF MEASURES 
3.1. Generally speaking, the follow-up of the RRP 
measures by the Commission delegations was adequate for 
the purpose of arriving at an overview of how they had 
been implemented. Only in Ethiopia was the multiplicity 
and the widely scattered nature of the measures under-
taken, along with the number of parties involved (national 
administrations and NGOs), such as to constitute a real 
obstacle to the transparency of the operations. The 
situation there was rendered all the more difficult because: 
(a) the national authorities refused most offers of technical 
assistance; 
(b) the national departments submitted few implemen-
tation reports, and those submitted were usually of low 
quality. 
In April 1989 the information available on four large 
projects accounting for 13,5 Mio ECU (36 % of the total) 
was clearly inadequate: 
(a) crop protection (4,3 Mio ECU): information was 
incomplete as to the actual distribution of 57 % of 
pesticides delivered; 
(b) afforestation (2,1 Mio ECU): the proportion of shoots 
which had rooted had not been measured; 
(c) information concerning allocation of supplies and 
equipment, in particular as regards smallholdings 
(2,9 Mio ECU); 
(d) agricultural inputs (4,2 Mio ECU): there was no 
indication of the results obtained as a result of the 
application of fertilizers. 
CENTRAL MONITORING OF MEASURES 
3.2. The financing decisions and the financial commit-
ments remained constantly under the control of the task 
force, which has generally monitored the total appropri-
ations and the reallocation of appropriations well. On the 
other hand, the Commission's central services were, to a 
large extent, unaware of the way in which the measures 
were actually being implemented in the field and did not 
have regular information about measures involving 
expenditure of 72 Mio ECU (i.e. 72 % of the programme). 
3.3. The Commission disbanded the task force after its 
final report had been published in December 1987, despite 
the fact that only 70 % of the RRP funds had been 
disbursed. On that date, the situation of about 40 % of the 
RRP measures was unclear, either because the operations 
had still not been completed or because the managing 
bodies had not submitted any activity reports. Having been 
disbanded at this stage, the task force was unable to carry 
out one of its main tasks, the overall evaluation of the 
measures implemented and of the lessons to be drawn from 
them for the future, in terms of procedures and the nature 
of the measures carried out. It would not in fact have been 
possible to make a worthwhile assessment of this kind until 
the end of 1988, i.e. one year later. 27. 3. 91  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 83/7 
ACCOUNTS AS A MONITORING INSTRUMENT 
3.4. The financial structure of the RRP has proved to be 
rather cumbersome because of fluctuations in the volume 
of total appropriations, the existence of a reserve, 
exceptional administrative procedures and the high 
number of operations to be monitored (about a hundred 
measures split up into 320 commitments). Moreover, for 
the countries of the franc area, it was only after long delays 
that many of the payments made locally could be entered in 
the project accounts by the Commission's central depart-
ments. 
3.5. As for the other EDF measures, the accounts of the 
RRP were kept by the Finance Directorate of DG VIII. In 
1987 the Commission lost control of the reserve account as 
evidenced by expenditure exceeding total appropriations 
by 2 Mio ECU. This resulted in a reorganization of the 
accounting, under which different accounts were opened 
for each country. After this reorganization had been 
completed, new defects in the organization became 
apparent: 
(a) it was no longer possible to monitor globally the 
various measures carried out in the same country; 
(b) the fact that commitments were not recorded in the 
accounts project by project but only in chronological 
order prevented individual monitoring of measures; 
(c) some measures were split between different accounts; 
(d) the commitments for some contracts were spread over 
several accounts; 
(e) some commitments covered several measures; and 
(f) in one case an RRP measure was partially charged to a 
standard EDF project. 
3.6. Despite a reorganization within the Finance Direct-
orate of DG VIII the accounting for the operations of four 
French-speaking countries came to a halt for eight months 
because of inadequate staffing procedures. 
3.7. The shortcomings in the RRP's accounting arrange-
ments have had serious consequences in terms of the 
regularity of entries: 
(a) many payments were made without any prior commit-
ments; the final adjustments for these payments were 
not made until the first six months of 1989; 
(b) booking errors were found for both commitments and 
payments, resulting in overruns of total appropriations 
which had not been immediately rectified; 
(c) for a long time, delays in the regularization of local 
payments distorted the estimates of the utilization of 
appropriations, making them lower than was actually 
the case, which resulted in cases where appropriations 
were transferred to other measures even though the 
appropriations transferred were no longer available; 
(d) many files did not contain the documents proving that 
the measures had been carried out (contracts; es-
timates; accounting statements; supporting docu-
ments for payments; acceptance certificates). 
There is no evidence in the Commission files that the 
Financial Controller took a stand on these various 
anomalies and inconsistencies. 
3.8. The Commission's central EDF accounting has not 
made it possible to ascertain the real situation of each RRP 
measure. For this reason, it could not be used as an 
instrument of management by the Chief Authorizing 
Officer, the task force or the delegations. In the case of 
Mauritania and Niger, staff from Brussels had to go to the 
delegations in November 1988 and June 1989 in order to 
reconstruct the accounts for these two countries. 
4. CONCLUSION 
4.1. With a few exceptions (8,9 Mio ECU), the measures 
selected within the framework of the RRP did correspond 
to the programme's requirements, but in some countries, 
such as Ethiopia, the number and geographic dispersion of 
the measures made it difficult to monitor them (paragraph 
1.5). 
4.2. The initial aim of supporting the preparation of the 
1986-1987 agricultural campaign was not achieved because 
of delays during the first year of implementation. This aim 
was not realistic in the first place. However, despite the 
initial delays most of the measures were completed by the 
end of 1988 (paragraph 1.12). In comparison with the pace 
of execution of the more classic type of aid, these measures 
could thus be considered as having been speedily executed. No C 83/8  Official Journal of the European Communities  27. 3. 91 
4.3. Coordination of the EDF projects with the Member 
States' aid measures was extremely limited. In this respect, 
the Community and its member states failed to act in a 
coherent fashion (paragraph 1.3). 
4.4. The structure and procedures for implementing the 
RRP were not made sufficiently clear at the outset and this 
resulted in delays in decision-making (lack of regional 
coordination) and, above all, it meant that the task force 
responsible for coordinating the plan was not fully 
informed concerning the actual state of progress of the 
projects (paragraphs 1.10, 1.11 and 3.2). 
4.5. The Commission's attitude to the counterpart funds 
generated by various measures was ambiguous and it is 
only in Sudan that, thanks to effective technical assistance, 
the actual situation and utilization of the counterpart funds 
is known (paragraphs 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6). 
4.6. The plan's accounting organization was defective 
and it has not been possible to use the accounts as an 
instrument of management; on the contrary, its incon-
sistencies have been the reason behind losses of control 
The present report was adopted by the Court of 
February 1991. 
(Mauritania and Niger) and irregularities not detected by 
the Financial Controller (paragraphs 3.7 and 3.8). 
4.7. The task force set up in the Commission's central 
services basically concentrated on the definition of 
measures and the commitment of funds. It only minimally 
monitored the payments situation and the actual execution 
of the measures (paragraph 3.2). It did not carry out any 
systematic assessment of the impact of the measures either 
by country or in relation to the overall plan. In mid-1989, 
because of a significant gap in the availability of 
implementation reports and in view of the fact that the 
measures were dispersed over a wide area, it was not 
possible to pronounce on the impact of the RRP in the 
countries concerned. 
4.8. The task force was disbanded too early to be able to 
draw true lessons for this pilot programme as regards both 
the simplification of procedures and the measuring of the 
impact of the measures carried out. It would have been 
preferable, in the context of a pilot experiment, to have had 
an independent assessment made of the programme. In the 
absence of such an assessment a rare opportunity for 
evaluating an accelerated aid scheme has thus been lost 
(paragraph 3.3). 
litors in Luxembourg at its meeting of the 7th 
For the Court of Auditors 
Aldo ANGIOI 
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COMMISSION REPLY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.3. The four meetings in Brussels with the Member 
States were complemented by routine contacts with other 
bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. 
As regards coordination on the spot, the Commission gave 
instructions to its delegations in February 1986 concerning 
the identification and implementation of the programme, 
which included coordination with the National Author-
izing Officers, the local administrations concerned, the 
representatives of the Member States on the spot, and any 
other major donors involved. 
The three cases mentioned by the Court concern projects 
where there was integration of EDF actions with those of 
bilateral aid, which is a much more comprehensive notion 
than coordination; such integration could only be ensured 
for a limited number of projects considering the urgency of 
the programme and the time available. 
CONSISTENCY OF MEASURES WITH OBJECTIVES 
1.4. The Commission notes the Court's view that 'the 
great majority of the measures chosen corresponded to the 
objectives of the RRP' but believes that the four measures 
cited as exceptions by the Court also corresponded to the 
objectives mentioned in paragraph 1.2 of reinforcing the 
existing structures in the recipient countries and supporting 
the rural areas which have suffered from the drought by 
reviving agriculture there. 
1.5. The whole concept of the operation was to distribute 
the aid among the widest range of beneficiaries possible, 
and not to concentrate on a smaller number of actions. 
1.6-1.7. In each of the target countries, there was 
already a working system of administration set up in order 
to manage normal EDF projects. This system, which is 
based on the appointment of a National Authorizing 
Officer and a Commission delegate in the recipient 
country, is foreseen in the various Lome Conventions and 
functions well under normal circumstances. 
The administrative coordination of the programme at the 
national level was therefore foreseen by the relevant 
National Authorizing Officer. As the Court notes in 1.7, it 
was also possible to supplement the management of the aid 
in many cases by appointing technical assistance. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES 
1.10. As mentioned in point 1.3, the Commission gave 
precise instructions to its delegations in February 1986 
concerning the identification, decision and implementation 
of the actions under the RRP. Any reporting omissions by 
the delegations to the central departments were due to the 
pressures caused by the overload of work on staff; with the 
RRP work in addition to normal implementation of the 
Lome Conventions, written reports could not always be 
made, although the central services were informed of the 
situation directly on a regular basis. 
1.11. As stated in the reply to paragraphs 1.6-1.7, a 
coordination structure already existed in each beneficiary 
country, centred on the National Authorizing Officer, 
whose powers are defined in article 30 of protocol 2 of the 
Lome I Convention and article 122 of the Lome II 
Convention. 
Thus, although delays were experienced with the im-
plementation of the RRP, these were not caused by any lack 
of authority vested in the national coordinators, but rather 
by the over-burdening of these coordinators in an 
emergency situation. 
On 17 April 1986, the Commission informed the Develop-
ment Council of a total of 60 schemes approved for 78 Mio 
ECU; by the beginning of July 1986, 79 schemes had been 
approved for 90,7 Mio ECU. The postponement of the 
deadline for commitments by one year to 30 June 1987 was 
made necessary by the cancellation of a number of schemes 
which turned out to be infeasible in practice and their 
replacement by new projects. The reserve of 15 Mio ECU 
remaining on 30 June 1987 was left as a precaution against 
project over-runs which are always possible with this type 
of operation. This reserve was used for supplementary 
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1.12. As shown in the Court's table 1, the RRP was 99 % 
committed and 95 % paid at the end of 1989. Indeed, as the 
Court points out, most of the measures had already been 
carried out by the end of 1988. 
As regards the five projects mentioned by the Court, the 
payments still outstanding now amount to a total of 
2,1 Mio ECU (2 % of the programme), and it is expected 
that most of the contract commitments will be closed 
shortly. 
2. COUNTERPART FUNDS 
2.4. Local currency counterpart funds are set up by the 
recipient country as a 'quid pro quo' for ECU transfers 
from the Commission, for example by the local sale of food 
aid. As stated in paragraph 13.45 of the Commission's 
replies to the Annual report of the Court for 1989, these 
counterpart funds cannot be considered as belonging to the 
Commission like normal aid credits. See also point 2.5-2.6. 
It is true that the setting up of counterpart funds was at first 
overlooked in Ethiopia, although this was rectified later; as 
regards Mauritania, the counterpart funds were not placed 
in specific accounts as they were merged with counterpart 
funds arising from other donors. 
(a) As regards the storage of agricultural inputs (fertilizers) 
in Mauritania, the poor conditions were due largely to 
the fact that the department responsible was con-
fronted at the time with major gifts from other donors, 
such as Canada which required the inputs to be stored 
for several years. Since the beginning of 1990, these old 
stocks have been completely used up. 
(b) The sale of rice seeds at below market price was 
necessary to be able to sell them at all. Even during 
normal times, the small rice-growers in Mauritania did 
not then recognise the value of the improved seeds, and 
refused to pay for them at prices much above that of 
normal paddy rice. 
2.5 - 2.6. The complex subject of counterpart funds has 
been the subject of much consideration and discussion 
within the Commission, in conjunction with other donors 
(especially the IMF and the World Bank) and recipient 
countries. A policy paper was transmitted to the Council in 
October 1990, and instructions will shortly be issued to the 
Commission's delegations. A copy will be addressed to the 
Court. 
3. FOLLOW-UP OF RESULTS 
CENTRAL MONITORING OF MEASURES 
3.2. See reply to paragraph 1.10. 
3.3. The task force was disbanded in December 1987 
because its objectives had been achieved, and its members 
were required for other priority development activities. 
The essential work of the task force was the identification 
and putting into operation of the RRP; once the projects 
were under way, their progress was monitored by the 
delegations and the central geographical units, and the 
accounting was the responsibility of the finance direct-
orate. By the end of 1987, all projects were under 
implementation, so there was no further need for the 
existence of the task force. 
Its report of December 1987 did indeed draw various 
conclusions for the future, particularly concerning the 
modifications made to the internal financial procedures of 
the European Development Fund, and the need for 
flexibility in this type of action. 
The conclusions of this report will be most useful as a guide 
should a similar operation prove to be necessary in the 
future. 
ACCOUNTS AS A MONITORING INSTRUMENT 
3.5. It was felt at the outset that the accounting system 
normally used for EDF operations, which is based on 
primary commitments at project level and secondary 
commitments at contract level, would be too heavy for the 
emergency situation in which the RRP was placed. 
To counter this, primary commitments were made at the 
level of the plan itself rather than for individual projects or 
schemes in order to speed up implementation. This meant 
that the secondary commitments, based on contracts, often 
covered more than one scheme, which gave rise to 
difficulties in following the implementation of specific 
schemes. Nevertheless, control of the overall financial 
situation was ensured. 
3.6. The difficulty in keeping the accounting up-to-date 
was caused by a shortage of staff rather than by any 
inadequacy in the staffing procedures. 
3.7. (a) See paragraph 13.20 of the replies of the 
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(b) - (c) Both booking errors and delays in regularization 
of local payments are the result of the combination of the 
extra burden of work caused by the RRP and the shortage 
of staff in the authorizations and accounting unit, rather 
than the result of the particular accounting arrangements 
adopted for the RRP. 
(d) The detailed justifying documents were held by the 
delegations and were available at the request of the central 
services. As regards the Financial Controller's position, see 
reply to paragraphs 14.26-14.28 of the Annual report of the 
Court for 1989. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, the RRP was clearly a successful operation, with a 
positive impact on the target countries concerned. The 
Commission is pleased to note the Courts' comments in its 
conclusions (paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2) that the measures 
selected corresponded to the programme's requirements, 
and that by comparison with the more classic type of aid, 
they could be considered as having been speedily executed. 
As mentioned in its reply to paragraph 1.3, the Commission 
believes that effective coordination was ensured with other 
donors, and (paragraph 1.10) that the central services were 
largely informed of the progress of the projects. 
It agrees that its policy regarding counterpart funds had not 
been fully worked out at the time of the RRP, but this has 
now been rectified by a policy paper transmitted to the 
Council in October 1990, which will be followed up by 
detailed instructions to its delegations shortly. 
It also agrees that the current computerized accounting 
system for the EDF is not sufficiently flexible to be able to 
be adapted to an unusual situation like that in which the 
RRP was made necessary, but it is being relaced by a more 
modern and flexible computerized system in 1991. 
Finally, it agrees thet the prime objective of the task force 
set up in the central services was the definition of measures 
and commitment of funds; the subsequent monitoring of 
the project implementation was for the delegations and 
central units normally responsible for the projects in the 
target countries concerned. The final report of the task 
force in December 1987 makes a valuable summary of the 
successes and difficulties of the RRP. It is unlikely that a 
supplementary evaluation of the programme would have 
significantly added to the operational conclusions drawn. 